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Abstract
Using detailed information of establishments owned by U.S. public firms, we construct
a novel measure of geographic linkage between firms. We show that the returns
of geography-linked firms have strong predictive power for focal firm returns and
fundamentals. A long-short strategy based on this effect yields monthly value-weighted
alpha of approximately 60 basis points. This effect is distinct from other cross-firm
return predictability and is not easily attributable to risk-based explanations. It
is more pronounced for focal firms that receive lower investor attention, are more
costly to arbitrage and during high sentiment periods. In addition, we find sell-
side analysts similarly underreact, as their forecast revisions of geography-linked
firms predict their future revisions of focal firms. Our results are broadly consistent
with sluggish price adjustment to nuanced news affecting firms with geographically-
overlapped establishmens.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized that location plays an important role in shaping economic
growth through generating economies of scale in production process and facilitating
knowledge spillover among neighboring firms and workers (Marshall (1920)). A growing
literature shows that geographic locations are also important for understanding firms’
fundamental performance (Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2015); Tuzel and Zhang (2017)),
the speed of information transmission (Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Malloy (2005); Parsons,
Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018)), the level of discount rate (Garcia and Norli (2012)), stock
liquidity (Loughran and Schultz (2005)) and even financial misconduct (Parsons, Sulaeman,
and Titman (2018)). However, existing studies mostly identify a firm’s geographic location as
its headquarter, while ignoring the fact that for many firms, the more economically relevant
geographic unit should be its establishment location where sales are generated and goods
are produced (Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2015)).
In this study, we examine the implications of firms’ geographic linkage for the price
discovery and information diffusion process. In particular, we hypothesize that a firm’s
fundamental and stock performance should comove with its geography-linked peer firms,
which we identify based on firms’ disaggregated establishment location information. This
interdependence among firms that are geographically overlapped could arise for many
reasons. For example, firms with establishments in the same areas are exposed to common
local economic shocks, which will then affect demand for firms’ products and input prices
(such as labor costs and land prices). In addition, there are occasional natural disasters
occuring in certain areas that may disrupt firms’ production process (e.g, Hurricane Harvey
in Texas and Louisiana in 2017). Firms also benefit from the local agglomeration effect due to
knowledge diffusion between a city’s workers (Moretti (2004)), technology spillover between
neiboring firms (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993)), and consumption externalities
among local residents (Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001)). These common shocks and spillover
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effects can naturally lead to fundamental and return comovement between firms that have
geographically overlapped establishments.
Our empirical evidence verifies the conjecture that geographic links lead to comovement
in firms’ fundamentals, even for firms that operate in different industries and headquartered
in different regions. More strikingly, we document significant return predictability across
geography-linked firms. Specifically, we document a novel empirical relation wherein the
stock returns of focal firms exhibit a predictable lag with respect to the recent returns
of a portfolio of its geographic peers (“geo-peers”). Focal firms whose geo-peers earn
higher (lower) returns will themselves earn higher (lower) returns in subsequent months.
A trading strategy using a proxy based on lagged geo-peers’ returns yields annual Carhart
(1997) four-factor alpha of 6-7%. These results are robust to an extensive list of control
variables and cannot be easily explained by risk-based explanations. Rather, our evidence
appears most consistent with sluggish price adjustment to nuanced news affecting firms with
geographically-overlapped establishments.
To study the comovement and lead-lag effect among geography-linked firms, we obtain
establishment-level data from the NETS database. This database provides addresses, as
well information on sales and employment, for each U.S. establishment owned by a public
company over the period from 1989 to 2012. With this data, we construct a pairwise
geographic linkage between firms using their establishment location information. Specifically,
geographic linkage GEOijt is defined as the uncentered correlation of the distribution of sales
between two firms i and j across all counties in US, GEOijt =
Git∗G′jt√
(Git∗G′it)∗(Gjt∗G
′
jt)
, where
Git = (Git1, Git2, ..., Git3022) is a vector of firm i’s proportional share of sales across 3,022
U.S. counties over year t.1 With this measure, we first verify a basic premise underlying
our hypothesis, that geographic linkage constructed using establishment location capture
fundamental relationship between firms. We find that firm fundamentals (sales and profit
1The geographic linkage measure is constructed in the same way as the product similarity used in Hoberg
and Phillips (2016), text similarity used in Cohen, Malloy, and Nguyen (2020), and technological proximity
measure used in Jaffe et al. (1986) and Lee, Sun, Wang, and Zhang (2019), among others.
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growth) are strongly correlated with current fundamentals of geography-linked peer firms,
even after controlling for the corresponding correlations using other linkage proxies including
industry links, same-headquarter links, and shared analyst links.
Two companies can have geographically overlapped establishments, yet are not operating
in the same industry and not headquartered in the same region. Consider the case of
Starbucks Corporation which is a chain of coffeehouses headquartered in Seattle, Washington,
and Whole Foods Market Inc., which is a supermarket chain headquartered in Austin, Texas.
Both firms have stores across major cities in US. From 2010 to 2012, the average geographic
linkage for these two firms is high: GEOijt =
Git∗G′jt√
(Git∗G′it)∗(Gjt∗G
′
jt)
= 0.68. Yet these firms
are not in the same industry (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code: 5812 vs. 5411)
nor are they headquartered in the same region. Furthermore, they are not product market
peers in the sense of Hoberg and Phillips (2016), as the text-based product similarity score
for these firms is only 0.015.2 However, these two firms generally target the same type of
consumers (white-collars who buy organic food products and enjoy drinking premium coffee),
hence it is very likely that sales and profits of the two firms comove with each other as both
are exposed to the same local economic conditions. This example illustrates the potential
importance of geographic linkage, as distinct from other economic linkages explored by prior
studies. While it is natural for firms in the same industry to cluster in the same area, close
geographic proximity can often transcend industrial boundaries.
Next, we implement a portfolio approach to study the return predictability among
geography-linked firms. Specifically, for each focal firm i at month t, we calculate the
weighted return of a portfolio of firms that share similar geographic locations as the focal
firm, GEORETit =
∑
j 6=i
GEOijt ∗ RETjt/
∑
j 6=i
GEOijt, where RETjt is the return of firm j at
month t and GEOijt is the geographic linkage measure we construct using information up to
2See Hoberg and Phillips (2016) for how product similarity scores are measured.
3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617417
month t.3 We then sort focal firms into deciles using returns earned by a portfolio of their
geo-peers in the previous month. Our results show that the geo-peers’ lagged returns can
significantly predict focal firm returns. A portfolio that long the focal firms whose geo-peers
performed best in the prior month and short the focal firms whose geo-peers performed worst
in the prior month, yields a value-weighted Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of 53 basis points
per month (t=2.62). We further confirm these return prediction results are robust to using
various factor models to adjust risk exposure. In addition, the return predictability persists
in Fama-MacBeth regressions when we include standard controls such as firm size, book-to-
market ratio, gross profitability, asset growth, short-term reversal, and medium-term price
momentum.
Prior studies have documented several lead-lag return effects among economically-related
firms, including firms operating in the same industries and product markets (Moskowitz
and Grinblatt (1999);Hoberg and Phillips (2018)), firms headquartered in the same regions
(Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018)), firms that are linked along the supply chain
(Cohen and Frazzini (2008); Menzly and Ozbas (2010)), single- and multi-segment firms
operating in the same industries (Cohen and Lou (2012)), and firms with similar technologies
(Lee, Sun, Wang, and Zhang (2019)). We conduct several tests to ensure that our novel
return predictability among geography-linked firms is not a rediscovery of these existing
interfirm linkages. First, given the well-known geographic agglomeration of firms in a single
industry (Ellison and Glaeser (1997)), it is likely that firms will have establishments largely
overlapping with their industry peers geographically. Similarly, firms whose headquarters
located in the same region will likely have geographically overlapped business operations. To
mitigate such concerns, we control for lagged industry return and lagged return of a portfolio
of firms headquartered in the same state as the focal firm in Fama-MacBeth regressions. In
3In our portfolio test, in order to ensure our results are distinct from the industry momentum effect
(Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)) and same-headquarter lead-lag effect (Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman
(2018)), we exclude all firms from the same industry (based on Fama-French 48 industry classification) and
headquartered in the same state as the focal firm when cosntructing GEORETit.
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addition, we control for the focal firm’s lagged tech-peer returns (Lee, Sun, Wang, and
Zhang (2019)), focal firm’s lagged pseudo-conglomerate returns (Cohen and Lou (2012)),
focal firm’s lagged supplier and customer industry returns (Menzly and Ozbas (2010)), and
focal firm’s product market peers’ returns (Hoberg and Phillips (2018)). Lastly, a recent
paper by Ali and Hirshleifer (2020) show that all the existing cross-firm return predictability
effects are a unified phenomenon captured by shared analyst coverage, that is, firms covered
by the same set of analysts. We thus add the lagged returns of stocks that are connected
to the focal stock through common analysts. The lead-lag return relationship among geo-
peers is robust to the presence of all these controls. Taken together, these tests show that
our measure of geographic linkage is distinct from existing interfirm links including industry
links, product market links, headquarter links, customer-supplier links, techonology links,
standalone-conglomerate firm links, and shared analysts links.
After establishing the robustness of lead-lag return effect among geography-linked firms,
we conduct tests to examine the economic mechanisms underlying the return predictability
results. Our preferred explanation is that investors have limited attention and are slow to
incorporate value-relevant information contained in focal firm’s geographic peers. If this
is the case, we should observe stronger return predictability among firms that are more
likely to be overlooked by investors. Consistent with this prediction, we find the return
predictability is more pronounced for focal firms that are smaller and have lower institutional
ownership. Also consistent with the idea that common analyst coverage expedite information
flow between economically-related firms (Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018); Ali and
Hirshleifer (2020)), we find weaker return predictability when the focal firm share a large
set of common analysts with its geo-peers. Second, the abnormal returns generated by our
trading strategy raise the question of why the profits are not quickly arbitraged away by smart
investors. Consistent with the idea that there are limits to arbitrage in real-world financial
markets, we find stronger return predictability among firms that are more costly to trade,
such as stocks with higher bid-ask spread, lower liquidity, and higher idiosyncratic volatility.
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In addition, using the Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment index, we find stronger return
predictability during high-sentiment periods. These cross-sectional and time-series tests help
confirm that we are truly capturing a mechanism of delayed updating of focal firm prices to
information important to their fundamental values.
Broadly speaking, there are two possible channels that can explain the comovement
and lead-lag relation among geographically-linked firms. First, firms with geographically-
overlapped establishments are naturally exposed to the same regional economic conditions
(the ”common exposure” channel). A second channel is that shocks originated from
geographic peers spillover to focal firm due to complementarity in investment opportunities
(the ”spillover” channel). Using natural disasters as localized shocks, we provide evidence
that the lead-lag relation we document (partially) results from shock spillover among
geographic peers in addition to their common exposure to local economy. This is a novel
channel in the context of cross-firm return predictability literature.
Although the return predictability effects we document is robust to adjustment using
various asset pricing models, one may still be concerned that other unobserved risks could
drive our results. We conduct several tests to further distinguish between mispricing and
risk explanation. First, we examine the stock price reaction around subsequent earnings
announcements. This test has been widely used in prior studies to separate mispricing from
risk explanations (e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989); La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997); Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff (2018)). The idea is intuitive: earnings
announcements help correct investor expectation errors about future cash flows; As a result,
if abnormal return is associated with investor biased beliefs about the firms’ fundamentals,
a disproportionate fraction of its returns should be realized around subsequent earnings
announcements. In contrast, if return predictability effect is driven by exposures to some
unknown risks, strategy returns should accrue more evenly over subsequent trading days.
Our tests show that the return spread generated from geo-peers’ return signal (GEORET ) is
166% higher on a day during an earnings announcement window than on a non-announcement
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day. This evidence is difficult to square with standard risk models.4
Second, we also examine the predictability of GEORET for focal firm’s future
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). SUEs are not return-based, so this test is not
confounded by imperfect controls for firm risks. At the same time, earnings are fundamental
drivers of firm value. If returns to the GEORET hedged portfolio are driven by predictable
changes in cash flows, rather than a compensation for risk, the GEORET signal should
also predict focal firms’ future SUEs. Our results show that geo-peers’ returns do strongly
predict focal firms’ subsequent SUEs. Consistent with a slow diffusion of earnings-related
news, focal firms with high (low) GEORET report higher (lower) future SUEs, even after
controlling for each firm’s own lagged SUEs. This result again suggests that the return
predictability associated with GEORET reflects incomplete price response to fundamental
information, rather than compensation for risks. In addition, this result, along with our
finding that the return predictability of GEORET lasts for several months and does not
reverse afterwards, strongly suggests that the predictable return based on GEORET is
driven by investor underreaction, not overreaction or liquidity effects. Lastly, we look at
analyst forecasting behavior to provide direct evidence on the limited attention channel. We
find that analysts are slow to carry information across geography-linked firms, as analyst
forecast revisions of geo-peers significantly predict future forecast revision of focal firms.
In addition to the tests reported in the main text of this study, our Internet Appendix
provides a battery of other robustness tests. First, we document the robustness of the
return predictability of GEORET to various perturbations in such as removing micro-cap
stocks and firms operating in few counties. Second, we report the robustness of return
predictability by two subperiods: 1990-2001 and 2002-2013. In both subperiods, we find
significant geographic lead-lag effect even after controlling for many other pricing anomalies.
Third, we examine the sensitivity of our result to the staleness of the geographic linkage
4Although Patton and Verardo (2012) find stock betas increase on earnings announcement days, the
increase in beta is symmetric for both positive and negative earnings surprises. As a result, time-varying
beta cannot explain the large increase in the long-short portfolio’s return spread on earnings announcement.
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measure. Our results show that the effect declines slightly with more ”stale” GEO data, but
is still significant even when we use five-year-old geographic linkage measure. Fourth, the
results are robust to alternative threshold used to define geographic peers. Finally, our result
persists if we construct geographic linkage using establishment employment data, which is
less likely to be imputed than sales in NETS data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys related
literature and discusses the contribution of this study. Section 3 describes the data and
presents summary statistics. Section 4 presents our main results on the lead-lag return
relationship among geography-linked firms. Section 5 explores the underlying channels
behind our results. Section 6 rules out risk-based explanations by conducting non-return-
based tests and examining analyst forecast behavior. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature and Contribution
Our paper contributes to several strands of existing literature. First, this study relates to
a large literature that examines investor belief updating in response to new information.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong
and Stein (1999), among others, suggest that investors may overweigh their own prior beliefs
and underweight value-relevant public information, especially when the public information
is less salient. A large set of empirical works lends support to this view.5 Studies also
document underreaction is more likely in settings where the nature of information is less
salient (DellaVigna and Pollet (2007); Giglio and Shue (2014)) or when investors are being
distracted (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)). Our study is similar in spirit, but examines the
slow diffusion of information contained in firms’ geographic peers, an important diver of firm
value that often transcends industry boundaries.
5For example, investors underreact to public announcements of corporate events including earnings
announcements (Bernard and Thomas (1989)), and share repurchase and issuance (Ikenberry, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen (1995)) etc.
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Our study is also related to a growing literature on the implicaton of investors’ limited
attention on information diffusion and market efficiency. Several theoretical works present a
framework for understanding market price dynamics when a subset of investors have limited
attention (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Peng and Xiong (2006)). The key message
from these models is that slow information diffusion due to investors’ limited attention
can generate return predictability patterns that are difficult to explain with rational asset
pricing models. These limited attention models have inspired a growing empirical literature.
Particularly noteworthy are recent studies that document a lead-lag return effect between
firms that have close economic links, such as industry links (Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999);
Hoberg and Phillips (2018)), customer-supplier links (Cohen and Frazzini (2008); Menzly and
Ozbas (2010)), technology links (Lee, Sun, Wang, and Zhang (2019)) and shared analyst links
(Ali and Hirshleifer (2020)). Our paper can be framed in terms of this literature, but we
focus specifically on geographic links. We show that geographic linkage is distinct from other
well-documented interfirm linkages.
Third, our study also contributes to the growing literature on the role of geography
in information diffusion and price discovery process. For example, Coval and Moskowitz
(2001) show that fund managers who are located close to firm headquarters earn higher
returns on their local investment than distant investment. Similarly, Malloy (2005) show
that geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than other analysts. Loughran
and Schultz (2005) document firms headquartered in rural areas have poorer information
environment and are traded less frequently compared to urban-based firms. Pirinsky and
Wang (2006) document strong comovement in the stock returns of firms headquartered in the
same geographic area. Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018) document a lead-lag return
effect among firms headquartered in the same state. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) find that
state-level economic factors (e.g., unemployment and housing collateral ratios) can predict
returns of stocks headquartered in those states. All these studies focus on firm’s headquarter
location. However, as shown by Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2015), the typical U.S.
9
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public firm has economic interests in five states beyond its corporate headquarters location.
A firm’s headquarter may be in one state, while its plants and operations are located in
other states, often far away from the headquarter. When the economic activities of a firm
are geographically segmented, value-relevant information about the firm is also likely to be
geographically dispersed.6 The innovation of this study is to infer the arrival of geographic
information for a firm from stock returns of other firms with economic activities in the
same areas. Our approach thus identifies the geographic links between firms beyond their
headquarter locations, and show the returns and fundamentals of focal firm can be predicted
by its geographic peers.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Data
To capture firms’ geographic footprints, we obtain establishment-level data from the NETS
Publicly Listed Database produced by Walls & Associates using using Dun and Bradstreet
(D&B) data. The NETS database provides annual employment and sales data for more than
63 million U.S. businesses and establishments (i.e., headquarters, subsidiaries, branches, and
plants across the United States). This database maintains an essentially complete record
of all establishments going back to 1989. Establishments are not legally required to report
to D&B; however, D&B is a leading provider of business credit information and thus those
establishments that wish to obtain lines of credit with suppliers or financial institutions have
incentives to report to D&B. Additionally, D&B attempts to develop complete business
lists by collecting information from independent sources, including phone calls, legal and
bankruptcy filings, press reports, payment and collection activities, and government and
6A notable exception in the literature is Garcia and Norli (2012) that identifies U.S. states that are
economically relevant for a company through textual analysis of annual reports.
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postal records.7 Recent studies employing NETS data include Neumark, Wall, and Zhang
(2011), Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Addoum, Ng, and Ortiz-Bobea (2020), among
others. We match each establishment with its parent company in Compustat by company
name. The matching procedure includes both machine-matching and manual-matching.
We obtain monthly stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
and annual accounting data from Compustat. Our main sample consists of firms in the
intersection of the NETS Publicly Listed data, CRSP, and Compustat. We include all
common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) traded on the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ,
and exclude financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47). To ensure
that the relevant accounting information is publicly available to investors in the market, we
impose at least a six-month gap between fiscal-year end month and the portfolio formation
date. Specifically, we first match the NETS data in year t with Compustat accounting data
for the most recent fiscal year (i.e., the fiscal year ended in calendar year t). We then match
sample firms to CRSP stock returns from July of year t + 1 to June of year t + 2. We
require firms to have non-missing stock price and SIC classification code from CRSP, and
non-negative book equity data at the end of the previous fiscal year from Compustat. To
reduce the impact of penny stocks, we exclude stocks that are priced below one dollar a
share at the beginning of the holding period. We adjust the stock returns by delisting. If
a delisting return is missing and the delisting is performance-related, we set the delisting
return at -30% (Shumway (1997)).
We define our pairwise measure of geographic linkage, GEOijt, as the uncentered
correlation of the distributions of sales across all counties in US between all pairs of firms i
and j,
GEOijt =
Git ∗G′jt√
(Git ∗G′it) ∗ (Gjt ∗G′jt)
(1)
where Git = (Git1, Git2, ..., Git3022) is a vector of firm i’s proportional share of sales across
7Barnatchez, Crane, and Decker (2017) conduct a through assessment of the NETS data and conclude
that NETS data is useful and convenient for studying business activity in high detail.
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3,022 U.S. counties over year t. GEOijt has fhe following properties: it is unity for firms
whose geographic vectors are identical, and zero for firms whose vectors are orthogonal and
it is bounded between zero and one for all other pairs. It is closer to unity the greater the
degree of overlap of the two firms’ establishment locations.8 Further more, this measure is
symmetric in firm ordering (i.e., GEOijt = GEOjit) and not directly affected by the length
of the G vectors.9
We then define geography-linked return (GEORET ) as the weighted-average monthly
return of geography-linked firms, with pairwise geographic linkage as weight. Formally,
geography-linked return for firm i at month t is defined as:
GEORETit =
∑
j 6=i
GEOijτ−1 ∗RETjt/
∑
j 6=i
GEOijτ−1 (2)
where RETjt is the raw return of firm j at month t. Note that GEO naturally serves as a
weighting function in calculating the portfolio return of geography-linked firms, such that
firms more overlapped with the focal firm in geographic space receive higher weight. GEO
is calculated at the end of each calendar year τ − 1 based on NETS data in that year, and
then mapped to the monthly stock return data from July of year τ to June of year τ + 1.
We use standard control variables in our empirical analysis. Size is defined as the
natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book-to-market
ratio (BM) is the most recent fiscal year-end report of book value divided by the market
capitalization at the end of calendar year t − 1. Book value equals the value of common
8As an example, suppose there are three firms A, B, and C, with establishment sales across three US
counties, as follows: GA = (0, 0, 1), GB = (0.6, 0.2, 0, 2), GC = (1, 0, 0). In this example, GAB=0.13, GAC=0,
and GBC=0.90. Intuitively, firms A and C have no establishments in the same county and are thus assigned
a geographic linkage measure of zero. These two firms would not be geo-peers for purposes of our analysis.
Firm B has geographically overlapping establishments with both firm A and firm C. However, as shown
above, firm B is more closely connected to firm C geographically (GBC = 0.90), than it is to firm A (GAB
= 0.13). This is because a higher proportion of B’s sales are in the 1st county than in the 3rd county.
9The length of the vector depends on the degree of geographic concentration of firms’ economic activities.
As a result, GEO will not capture the effect of geographic dispersion on stock returns as documented by
Garcia and Norli (2012).
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stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credits, and minus the book
value of preferred stock. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative holding-period
return over the last 12 months skipping the most recent month. RETt−1 is the prior month’s
return to capture short-term reversal effect. Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008),
asset growth (AG) is defined as year-over-year growth rate of total assets. Following Novy-
Marx (2013), gross profitability (GP ) is defined as sales revenue minus cost of goods sold
scaled by assets. Institutional ownership data of stocks are available from the Thomson
Reuters (formerly CDA/Spectrum) Institutional Holdings database (13F). Aanalyst forecast
data are from I/B/E/S.
3.2 Summary Statistics
The final sample consists of 668,117 firm-month observations spanning July 1990 to
December 2013. Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample firms.
The average number of firms per month is 2,320. On average our sample firms cover
around 57% of the CRSP common stock universe in terms of market capitalization. We
note that the average number of geography-linked firms per focal firm is 795. The pairwise
geographic linkage measure (GEO) has an average score of 0.09 with a standard deviation of
0.2, indicating large cross-sectional variation in geographic linkage among our sample firms.
The remaining summary statistics are well known and do not require additional discussion.
In Panel B of Table 1, we present the pairwise correlation between our variables. Several
correlation coefficients are noteworthy. Although GEORETt−1 exhibits trivial correlations
with a number of traditional return predictors (e.g., size, book-to-market, gross profitability,
and asset growth), it is considerably more correlated with industry return (INDRETt−1),
return of a portfolio of firms headquartered in the same state (HQRETt−1), and past
one-month return (RETt−1) (Pearson correlations are 0.095 for INDRETt−1, 0.316 for
HQRETt−1, and 0.062 for RETt−1). In subsequent analyses, we will control for these return
13
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predictors when examining the return predictability of GEORETt−1.
4 Empirical results
We next turn to the main results of the paper. We first verify that geography-linked firms
as identified by our measure are fundamentally related. We then show the lagged returns
of geography-linked firms have strong predictability power for focal firm returns and this
pattern is robust and distinct from existing cross-firm return predictability effects.
4.1 Fundamental comovement
We first verify our geographic linkage measure by examining whether our measure captures
fundamental relationship bewteen geography-linked peer firms. Specifically, we regress focal
firms’ annual sales and profitability growth measures on the average growth measures of their
geo-peers (Geo sales growth). We calculate the average growth variables of geo-peers using
the same methodology as used in calculating GEORET . Geo sales growth is calculated
as the weighted average sales growth of geo-peers using the weights in equation 3.1. All
regressions include year fixed effects and size and book-to-market ratio as controls. To
ensure that the growth variables for all firms are measured over the same horizon, we only
include firms with December fiscal year ends.
Table 2 presents the results. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on Geo sales growth is
0.311 (t=3.25), indicating that there is a strong contemporaneous correlation between focal
firm’s and geo-peers’ sales growth. In column 2, we add the average sales growth of other
economically-linked peer firms. Specifically, industry sales growth is measured as the market
capitalization-weighted average sales growth of all other firms in the same industry (based
on Fama-French 48 industry classifications) as the focal firm. Same-state sales growth is
measured as the average sales growth of all other firms headquartered in the same state as
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the focal firm. Analyst sales growth is calculated the weighted average sales growth of shared
analyst-linked peers, using the weights defined in Ali and Hirshleifer (2020). The coefficient
on Geo sales growth decreases to 0.199, but remains significant. Columns 3 and 4 show
that the same conclusions hold when fundamental performance is measured as profitability
growth instead of sales growth.
Overall, these results strongly suggest that our measure of geographic linkage captures
fundamental relatedness between firms and that geographic linkage is distinct from other
interfirm linkages identified in previous studies.
4.2 Portfolio tests
In this section, we show that stocks sorted based on their geography-linked peers’ returns
generate significant return spreads. We conduct the decile portfolio sorts as follows. At the
beginning of each month, we sort stocks into deciles by the return earned by their geography-
linked peers in the previous month (GEORETt−1). To ensure our results are distinct from the
industry momentum effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)) and same-headquarter lead-lag
effect (Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018)), we exclude all firms from the same industry
(based on Fama-French 48 industry classification) and headquartered in the same state as
the focal firm when cosntructing GEORETit for the portfolio tests. These decile portfolios
are then rebalanced at the beginning of each month to maintain either equal or value weights.
We use the time series of monthly portfolio returns to compute the average excess return
(and alphas) of the lowest decile (1) and the highest decile (10) portfolio over the entire
sample. As we are most interested in the return spread between the two extreme deciles, we
also report the return to a long–short portfolio, i.e., a zero-investment portfolio that longs
the stocks in the highest GEORETt−1 decile and shorts the stocks in the lowest decile (L/S).
We compute these returns by subtracting either the risk-free return (excess returns) or by
using a variety of factor models.
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Table 3 Panel A provides strong evidence that geography-linked firms’ returns predict
focal firm returns. Specifically, we find that the equal-weighted long-short GEORET
strategy (L/S), yields average monthly returns of 41 basis points (t = 2.97), or roughly 6%
per year. Unlike most anomalies, the L/S strategy generates value-weighted returns that are
even larger at 54 basis points per month (t = 2.62), or about 6.5% per year. In the next five
columns, we control for the portfolios’ exposure to standard asset-pricing factors. The same
L/S strategy delivers CAPM alphas of 0.44% (0.54%) per month in equal- (value-) weighted
portfolios. This strategy delivers Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas of 0.44%
(0.53%) per month in equal- (value-) weighted portfolios. Augmenting this model by adding
the stock’s own price momentum (Carhart (1997)) does not significantly affect the strategy,
as the four-factor alpha remains at 0.41% (0.53%) per months in equal- (value-) weighted
portfolios. We also adjust returns using the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model
(5-Factor), and also conduct a test using the five-factor model plus the momentum factor
and a short-term reversal factor (7-Factor). We find that the strategy’s alpha only slightly
changes after controlling for these factors, with the five-factor and seven-factor strategies
earning abnormal monthly returns of 0.40% (0.57%) and 0.41% (0.60%), respectively, in
equal- (value-) weighted portfolios. Finally, we report the portfolio alpha using the Q factors
of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) as the asset pricing model. The Q-factor alphas continue to
be significant, with a value-weighted monthly alpha of 0.62% (t=2.64). These results show
that focal firms with high (low) geo-peers’ returns earn high (low) subsequent returns, after
controlling for common risk factors.
In Panel B of Table 3, we report the portfolio alpha as well as the factor loadings on each
of the Fama-French three factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (MOM) and a
short-term reversal factor (ST Rev). The L/S portfolio has little exposure to most factors, as
the loadings on factors are economically small and statistically insignificant. One important
exception is the significant and negative loading on the short-term reversal factor (long prior
month loser and short prior month winner), which is consistent with our observation that
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GEORETt−1 is positively correlated with prior month return RETt−1. This finding can
perhaps explain why risk-adjusted returns of the L/S strategy are not very different from
excess return.
In Figure 1, we plot the value of a hypothetical dollar invested in each of three portfolios.
The first, shown in red, shows the evolution of a dollar invested in the S&P 500 index.
Dividends are assumed to be reinvested. Against this benchmark, we also plot the 10% of
firms with the highest lagged 1-month GEORET (blue), as well as the 10% of firms with
the lowest lagged 1-month GEORET (green). While the market portfolio grows by a factor
of over 4 from 1990 to 2013, one dollar invested in the lowest decile barely exceeds $3. On
the other hand, a $1 investment in the highest decile performs almost an order of magnitude
better, growing to approximately $20 by 2013.
4.3 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
In this section, we test the return predictability of GEORET using the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regression methodology. One advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to
examine the predictive power of GEORET while controlling for other known predictors of
cross-sectional stock returns. This is important because, as shown in Table 1, GEORET is
correlated with some of these predictors. We conduct the Fama-MacBeth regressions in the
usual way. For each month, starting in July 1990 and ending with December 2013, we run
the following cross-sectional regression:
Reti,t = β0 + β1GEORETi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + i,t (3)
where Reti,t is the raw return of focal firm i in month t, GEORETi,t−1 is the average
return of the focal firm i’s geo-peers in month t − 1, and Xi,t−1 is a set of control variables
known to predict returns, including the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (BM),
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the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Size), returns from the prior month
(RETt−1), returns from the prior 12-month period excluding month t − 1 (MOM), gross
profitability (GP ), and asset growth (AG).
Table 3 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the independent variables,
and the t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. Column 1 shows the coefficient on GEORETt−1 is 8.317 with a t-statistics
of 4.81, suggesting that geography-linked firms’ return strongly predict next-month focal
firm return even after controlling for well-known return predictors. Economically, a two-
standard deviation increase in GEORETt−1 leads to approximately 50 basis points increase
in focal firm return. The result from Fama-MacBeth regression is consistent with time-series
portfolio tests. The coefficients on control variables are also consistent with prior literature:
asset growth and short-term reversal variables are significantly negatively correlated with
future returns, while book-to-market ratio and gross profitability are significantly positively
correlated with future returns.10
One of stylized facts in urban economics is that firms from the same industry tend to
cluster together geographically (Ellison and Glaeser (1997)). As a result, it is likely that firms
will have establishments largely overlap with their industry peers geographically. Similarly,
firms whose headquarters located in the same areas will have geographically overlapped
business operations by construction. To mitigate such concerns, in Column 2, we add
the lagged value-weighted industry return (INDRET ) and lagged value-weighted return
of a portfolio of firms headquartered in the same state as the focal firm (HQRET ) in
regression. Compared to Column 1, the coefficient on GEORET decreases to 5.957, but
remains highly significant with a t-statistics of 4.01. The coefficients on INDRET and
HQRET are both positive and significant, consistent with the industry momentum effect
documented by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and the same-headquarter lead-lag effect
10The coefficient of MOM is positive but insignificant, potentially due to the 2009 momentum crash
documented by Daniel and Moskowitz (2016).
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shown by Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018).
In Columns 3 to 7, we control for other interfirm linkages as documented by prior
studies.11 In Column 3, we add the focal firm’s lagged technology-peer return (TECHRET )
following Lee, Sun, Wang, and Zhang (2019), who document a lead-lag effect among firms
overlapping in technology space. In Column 4, a portfolio of focal firm’s pseudo-conglomerate
returns (PCRET ) is added based on Compustat Segment data following Cohen and Lou
(2012), who show substantial return predictability from standalone firms to conglomerates.
In Column 5, we add the lagged returns from a portfolio of the focal firm’s supplier industry
(SUPPRET ) and customer industry (CUSTRET ). These portfolios are constructed using
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Input-Output data (at the summary industry level)
following Menzly and Ozbas (2010). In Column 6, we add the lagged returns of focal firm’s
product market peers, which are identified based on textual analysis of firms’ 10-K filings.
Following Hoberg and Phillips (2018), we use the TNIC-3 network, which is calibrated to
have a granularity to be comparable with SIC-3 code. In Column 7, we add the lagged return
from a portfolio of firms that have shared analyst coverage with the focal firm (CFRET ),
following Ali and Hirshleifer (2020).
There are several noteworthy patterns. First, the coefficients on these variables are
almost all siginificant and positive, consistent with prior literature. The only exception
is that coefficients on customers’ (CUSTRET ) and supplers’ returns (SUPPRET ) are
insignificantly positive, which could potentially due to difference in sample period. More
importantly, we find the coefficient on GEORETt−1 remains highly significant after
controlling for these known interfirm linkages. In particular, we continue to find significant
return predictability for GEORET after controlling for interfirm links between stocks
covered by common analysts, which as argued by Ali and Hirshleifer (2020), captures all
the existing cross-firm return predictability effects. This finding may not be surprising
11Because the data availability on these additional linkage measures greatly reduce the sample size, we
do not control for these variables in subsequent analyses.
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as even skilled analysts may not closely track news about firms’ geo-peers and quickly
impound relevant information into focal firm’s prices. We provide more evidence supporting
underreaction on the part of analysts in subsequent sections.
While most of the previous cross-firm return predictability studies have focused on one-
month lagged returns as predictors, some studies also examine longer horizon lags. Appendix
Table A2 shows that returns of geographic peers over the past 6 and 12 months are still
significant predictors of future focal firm return, while geo-peers’ returns over past 24 months
lose its predictive power. However, both the statistical significance and economic magnitude
of the long-horizon effects are rather modest. This is consistent with prior studies that
most of the cross-firm return predictability effects are strongest at the one-month horizon
(Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999); Ali and Hirshleifer (2020)). It suggests that although the
market is not perfectly efficient, it reacts quickly enough to start incorporating value-relevant
news into stock prices within a month.
We also examine the long-run return pattern of the lead-lag effect between geography-
linked firms. If investors overreact to the news contained in lagged geo-peers’ returns, we
should observe some return reversal over longer holding periods. On the other hand, if
the effect we document is primarily an underreaction to the news that affects focal firms’
fundamental value, we should see no return reversal in the future. In Figure 2, we evaluate
these two alternative hypotheses by plotting the cumulative return to the GEORET hedged
portfolio in the six months after portfolio formation. Consistent with slow diffusion of
geographic information, we continue to observe a modest upward drift in portfolio returns
through month six. In fact, we find no sign of a return reversal over the next 12 to 24
months. These findings are similar to the results from other cross-firm return predictability
studies (Cohen and Frazzini (2008); Cohen and Lou (2012); Lee, Sun, Wang, and Zhang
(2019)). Overall, the evidence seems to be most consistent with delayed response of focal firm
prices to fundamental information contained in returns of geo-peers, and not an overreaction
phenomenon.
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4.4 Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct a battery of robustness tests on geography-linked return
predictability, and report the results in Appendix Table A3.
4.4.1 Excluding micro-cap stocks
First, to alleviate the concern that our results are driven by micro-cap stocks, we exclude
stocks with price less than $5 or market capitalization below the 10th NYSE percentile.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A3 shows that the coefficients of GEORETt−1 are still positive
and highly significant in both settings, suggesting that our result is not driven by micro-cap
stocks. Given that small firms are more likely to operate in a single area, another way to
remove micro-cap stocks is to restrict our sample to focal firms with establishments in at
least two counties. Column 3 shows the predictive power of GEORETt−1 is robust to this
sample selection criteria.
4.4.2 Geography-linked return predictability across time
In Columns 4 and 5 of Table A3, we examine whether the return predictability of geography-
linked firms varies over time. We divide our full sample period into two subperiods: 1990-2001
and 2002–2013. We then repeat our baseline Fama-MacBeth regression for each subperiod.
Our results hold up well in both periods, after controlling for various return predictors. The
coefficients of GEORETt−1 are similar in two subperiods, being 6.406 (t=2.75) during 1990-
2001 and 5.426 (t=3.24) during 2002-2013. This remarkable persistence in the coefficient
of GEORETt−1 is in sharp constrast with that of some other return predictors, which
declines substantially in the recent period. Consistent with prior studies, we find the effect of
industry momentum reduce by more than half and the own price momentum effect becomes
insignificant over the 2002-2013 period (Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018)). What is
more noteworthy from our perspective is that the return predictability of geography-linked
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firms is robust in both subperiods.
4.4.3 Persistence of the geographic linkage measure
We also examine the sensitivity of our main result to the age of the geographic linkage
measure. Untabulated analysis shows the correlations between GEOi,j,t and its corre-
sponding one-year lagged measures is 0.95, suggesting that firms’ geographic footprints are
relatively persistent over time. Columns 6-8 of table A3 shows GEORETt−1 constructed
using lagged values of GEO also predict focal firm returns. While predictability decreases
with the number of lagged years, even five-year-old geographic linkage measures work quite
well. One implication is that investors do not need extremely timely information on firms’
establishments location information to implement this strategy. Even relatively ”stale”
geographic information have some predictive power for focal firm returns.
4.4.4 Using alternative geographic peers
In our main tests, a geographic peer is defined as a firm with any geographic overlap with the
focal firm (i.e. any firm whose GEO value is greater than zero). To evaluate the sensitivity of
our results to this cut-off value, we conduct a test where the peer sample is limited to just the
top 50 geo-peers of the focal firm. Finally, we also construct alternative geographic linkage
measure using establishment employment data, as the number of employees at establishments
are less likely to be imputed than sales in NETS data. Column 9 and 10 of Table A3 show
that the predictive power of GEORET is still robust using these alternative proxies of
geographic peers.
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5 Mechanism
The results so far suggest that the lead-lag effects between geography-linked firms we
document may be driven by slow dissemination of geographic news. In this section, we
further explore the cross-sectional heterogeneity of our main results to various firm and
stock characteristics associated with: (a) the extent to which investors might be attentive to
such news, and (b) the costs that investors face if they attempt to profit from the mispricing.
In addition, we examine whether the return predictability of GEORET varies with aggregate
investor sentiment.
5.1 Limited attention
If investors are fully rational and have unlimited capacity to analyze all value-relevant
information, the news contained in geo-peers’ returns should be reflected in focal firm’s prices
in a timely fashion. However, a large set of theorectical and empirical studies show that due
to limited attention, investors tend to underweight public information, especially when the
information is less visible (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Giglio and Shue (2014)) or more
complicated to analyze (Cohen and Lou (2012)). If this is the case, the return predictability
of GEORET should be stronger among firms that receive less investor attention. Prior
literature proposes several measures of investor attention including firm size, institutional
ownership, and analyst common coverage.12 We posit that smaller firms, and firms that have
lower institutional ownership, and have fewer common analysts with their geographic peers,
receive less attention from investors and, therefore, will exhibit a more sluggish stock price
reaction to the information contained in GEORET .
To test this prediction, we define a size-based dummy variable that equals one if a focal
firm is above the sample median in terms of the log value of market capitalization at the end
12See, for example, Bali, Peng, Shen, and Tang (2014), Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018), and Ali
and Hirshleifer (2020).
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of the previous fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable that
equals one if the institutional ownership (IO) at the end of the previous year is above the
sample median. Finally, we define a dummy CANALY ST equals one if the average number
of analysts covering the focal firm and its geo-peers at the previous year-end is above sample
median, and zero otherwise. The results of these tests are reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table
5. Consistent with the prediction of limited attention channel, the coefficient estimates
on the three interaction terms between the investor attention dummies and GEORETt−1
are all negative, and in the case of firm size and institutional ownership, the interaction
term is statistically significant. This result lends support to our hypothesis that the return
predictability of GEORET is driven by investors’ inattention to the geographic linkage
information.
5.2 Costs of arbitrage
In addition to attention proxies, we consider how the return predictability varies across our
sample with different degrees of arbitrage costs. The evidence indicates that sophisticated
investors, such as arbitrageurs, also fail to incorporate the information embedded in
GEORET and bring stock prices to full-information value. We thus expect that our
results to be more pronounced among firms subject to greater limits to arbitrage. To test
this conjecture, we use three measures to proxy for the cost of arbitrage: idiosyncratic
volatility (IDV OL), bid-ask spread (Spread), and Amihud illiquidity (Illiquidity). Wurgler
and Zhuravskaya (2002) and Pontiff (2006) argue that arbitrageurs’ demand for a stock is
inversely related to its arbitrage risk, which is reflected in its idiosyncratic volatility.13 In
addition, prior research suggests that information diffusion into price is slower when trading
costs are higher and stocks are less liquid (Bali, Peng, Shen, and Tang (2014)). Therefore,
we expect the return predictability of GEORET will be more pronounced for less liquid
13Evidence supporting idiosyncratic return volatility as one of the most significant limits to arbitrage is
documented in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), for instance.
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stocks with higher bid-ask spread.
To test this prediction, we calculate idiosyncratic volatility (IDV OL) as the standard
deviation of the residuals from a regression of daily excess stock returns on Fama and French
(1993) factors within a month (at least ten daily returns required) following Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2006). Following Amihud (2002), ILLIQUIDITY is the average daily
ratio of absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume within each month. Following
Corwin and Schultz (2012), we calculate the bid-ask spread (SPREAD) from daily high
and low prices.14 For all three variables, we create a dummy variable equals one if the
corresponding proxy is above sample median in a month, and zero otherwise.
The results are reported in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 5. Column 4 shows that the
coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the idiosyncratic volatility dummy and
GEORETt−1 is positive and statistically significant, 5.318 (t=2.61). Column 5 and 6 shows
that the interaction term between an indicator of high bid-ask spread and higher Amihud
illiquidity and lagged geo-peers’ return (GEORETt−1) is also positive and statistically
significant. These findings lend support to our prediction that the return predictability
effect is stronger for more difficult-to-arbitrage stocks.
5.3 Investor Sentiment
Recent studies show that stock market mispricings are typically more pronounced when
the overall sentiment is high (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012); Antoniou, Doukas, and
Subrahmanyam (2016)), potentially due to amplification of investors’ behavioral biases
during high-sentiment periods. In our setting, this suggests that investors may pay less
14The Corwin and Schultz (2012) spread estimate is based on two reasonable assumptions. First, daily
high-prices are almost always buyer-initiated trades and daily low-prices are almost always seller-initiated
trades. The ratio of high and low prices for a day therefore reflects both the fundamental volatility of the
asset and its bid-ask spread. Second, the component of the high-to-low price ratio that is due to volatility
increases proportionately with the length of the trading interval while the component due to bid-ask spreads
do not. Corwin and Schultz (2012) show via simulations that, under realistic conditions, the correlation
between their spread estimates and true spreads is about 0.9 and their estimates are substantially more
precise than other spread estimators.
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attention to the performance of focal firm’s geographic peers, which are value-relevant but
less salient fundamental information. In addition, any level of mispricing would be more
difficult to be arbitraged away due to increased noise trader risks and short-sale constraints
(De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990)). As a result, we should expect the lead-
lag return effect among geography-linked firms to be stronger during high sentiment periods.
To test this idea, we use the Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment index (SENTIMENT )
to proxy for aggregate investor sentiment. We create a dummy variable equals one if
SENTIMENT is above sample median, and zero otherwise. Column 7 of Table 5 shows
that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between SENTIMENT dummy and
GEORETt−1 is indeed positive and significant. This finding provides further evidence
that return predictability of GEORET is likely a result of mispricing due to investors’
underreaction to geographic information, especially during high-sentiment periods.
5.4 Common exposure to regional economy or spillover effect?
Broadly speaking, there are two possible channels that can explain the comovement and lead-
lag relation among geographically-linked firms. First, firms with geographically-overlapped
establishments are naturally exposed to the same regional economic fundamentals (”common
exposure” channel). A second channel is that shocks originated from geographic peers
”spillover” to focal firm due to complementarity in investment opportunities or technology
spillover between neiboring firms (”spillover” channel). A key challenge in empirical tests is
to differentiate between these two channels.
We conduct two tests to examine whether common exposure to regional economy can
fully explain the return predictability of GEORET . Our first test is a subsample test that
groups firms into manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The idea is that because
manufacturing firms rely on national or even global demand for their products, common
exposure to local economic fundamentals is unlikely to explain the lead-lag return effects
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among manufacturing firms that are geographically linked. Appendix Table A4 reports the
Fama-MacBeth regression results for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms separately.
We find the coefficients on GEORETt−1 are significant and have similar economic magnitude
for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms, suggesting that our result is not fully
explained by the ”common exposure” channel. Second, we directly capture firms’ exposure
to regional economic condition by constructing a firm-specific predicted regional economic
activity proxy (PREA) following Smajlbegovic (2019). Specifically, PREA is the sales-
weighted average of economic activity growth rate across all states that the firm operates:
PREAit =
50∑
s=1
SALE SHAREi,s,τ−1 ∗
̂∆SCIs,t+6
SCIs,t
(4)
where
̂∆SCIs,t+6
SCIs,t
is the predicted growth rate of the State Coincident Index of state s in
month t for the next 6 months and SALE SHAREi,s,τ−1 is firm’s fraction of sales in state
s in last year. PREA can be interpreted as the average forecast of the economic activity
growth rate over all firm-relevant U.S. states. The orthogonalized proxy PREA⊥ is the sum
of a constant and the residuals of cross-sectional regressions of PREA on return sensitivities
to national economic activity and the Fama and French (1993) risk factors.
If the return predictability of GEORET is derived solely from a firm’s exposure to the
economic conditions of all regions where it operates, we should find the effect of GEORET
to be absorbed by PREA⊥ when predicting future returns. We report the corresponding
Fama-MacBeth regression result in column (1) of Table 6. Consistent with Smajlbegovic
(2019), the predicted regional economic activity meausre PREA⊥ significantly and positively
predict future stock return, indicating a slow diffusion of local macroeconomic information
into stock prices. More importantly, the coefficient of GEORET is still significantly positive,
suggesting the cross-firm return predictability is not fully explained by common exposure to
local economy.
To test any spillover effect among geographic peers, we examine whether a focal firm
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is negatively affected if its geographic peers are exposed to some negative shocks, even if
the focal firm itself have no establishments in the areas affected by the shock. Our test
is motivated by Giroud and Mueller (2019), who argue that when a firm’s establishment
experiences a negative shock to its cash flow, the firm will optimally ”spreads” the shock
across multiple establishments in an effort to equate their marginal productivity. As a result,
local shocks not only lead to sales declines at local business units but also at business units
in distant regions. Giroud and Mueller (2019) show that local shocks indeed propagate
across US regions through firms’ internal networks of establishments. To operationalize
the idea, we construct a measure GEO HAZARD as the weighted average of dummies
indicating geo-peers headquartered in states affected by any natural disaster in a month,
using geographic linkage (GEO) as weights. The advantage of using natural disaster is that
natural disasters are exogenous events that occurred throughout our sample period, and their
impacts are highly localized.15 In untabulated analysis, we find that GEO HAZARD leads
to lower sales growth over the next year for focal firms that themselves are not exposed to
any disasters. Column 2 of Table 6 reports the Fama-MacBeth regression results. The
coefficient of GEO HAZARD is -1.227 with a t-statistics of -2.71. This novel finding
provides support to the ”spillover” channel that local shocks to geographic peers transmit
to the focal firm through geographic linkage. Overall, we provide evidence that the lead-lag
relation between geographically-connected firms can result from a spillover effect in addition
to their common exposure to local economy, which has not been explored by previous studies
including Parsons, Sabbatucci, and Titman (2018).
15We obtain the natural hazards (including flooding, hurricane/Tropical Storm, Severe
Storm/Thunderstorm, Tornado, Wildfire) records at county-year level from SHELDUS (Spatial Hazard
Events and Losses Database for the United States).
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6 Risk explanations
In Section 4, we find that the return predictability of GEORET cannot be explained by
well-known risk factors, such as the Fama-French five-factors and the momentum factor.
Nevertheless, it is still possible that other unknown risks could drive our results. This would
be the case, for example, if geo-peers’ returns can somehow proxy for regional macroeconomic
risks, which would then lead to changes in focal firms’ discount rates. We conduct several
tests in this section to examine this possibility.
6.1 Returns around earnings announcements
First, we examine stock price reactions around subsequent earnings announcements. This
approach is widely used in the literature (see, for example, Bernard and Thomas (1989);
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997); Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff (2018)).
The idea is intuitive: if an anomaly is associated with mispricing, then it will be stronger in
the earnings announcement window, as the announcement of these earnings helps to correct
investor expectation errors about firms’ future cash flows. In contrast, if abnormal return
is driven by exposure to unobserved risks, then the subsequent returns should accrue more
evenly over subsequent periods. To conduct this test, we conduct panel regression analysis
following the methdology of Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff (2018). Our unit of observation
is firm-day rather than firm-month in this test. Specifically, we regress the daily return of a
stock (DRET ) on the last month geo-peers’ return (GEORET ), an earnings announcement
window dummy (EDAY ), and the interaction between the two variables. We also control
for day fixed effects and a set of control variables, including the lagged values for each of the
past ten days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume.
We present our results in Table 7. The earnings announcement window is defined as either
the one-day window (Columns 1 to 2) or a three-day window (Columns 3 to 4), centered
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on the earnings announcement date. The significantly positive coefficient on GEORET
suggest that returns of geographic peers can predict focal firm’s return on non-earnings
announcement days. Also consistent with the earnings announcement premium literature
(Frazzini and Lamont (2007)), the coefficient on earnings announcement date dummy is
positive and highly significant. More importantly, we find the coefficient on the interaction
term is positive and significant under all specifications. Consistent with the mispricing
explanation, returns to the GEORET strategy are much larger when earnings news are
released. For example, in Column 1, the coefficient on GEORET is 0.347 (t=2.82), while
the interaction coefficient on GEORET ∗EDAY 1 is 0.578 (t=2.04). The coefficients indicate
that for a GEORET value of 0.06 (two standard deviation change), expected returns are
higher by 2.08 basis points on non-earnings announcement days, and by an additional 3.47
basis points on earnings announcement days. In other words, the return spread generated
by the GEORET hedged strategy is 166% higher during an earnings announcement window
than that on non-announcement days. These results are extremely difficult to square with
standard risk-based explanations.
6.2 Evidence from non-return-based outcomes
6.2.1 Forecasting earnings surprises
Our preferred explanation for the return predictability results is that investors have limited
attention and are slow to incorporate information contained in returns of focal firm’s geo-
peers, and evidence so far support this mispricing explanation. However, disagreements
about whether return predictability reflects risk versus mispricing are often difficult to
resolve using only realized returns and risk proxies. This is because return predictability
can be attributed to risk, even if the source of risk is not directly observable or measurable.
As an alternative approach, we also examine whether GEORET has predictive power for
focal firm’s non-return-based outcomes. Our first non-return-based metric is focal firms’
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standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). SUEs capture unanticipated changes in firm’s
earnings and are not return-based, so this test would not be confounded by imperfect risk
controls. At the same time, unexpected earnings are fundamental drivers of firm value, so
results on earnings predictability could further confirm that the return predictability is due
to changes in unexpected firm cash flows, rather than compensation for some unobservable
risk.
To that end, we test whether the stock return of the geography-linked firms predicts future
unexpected earnings of the focal firm. The dependent variable is standardized unexpected
earnings (SUE), defined as the difference between the actual quarterly earnings per share
(EPS) and analyst consensus forecast of quarterly EPS scaled by stock prices in the month
before quarterly earnings announcement. The main explanatory variable of interest is lagged
GEORET , computed using the past three month returns of focal firm’s geo-peers. Control
variables include the focal firm’s own lagged SUEs, up to four quarters.
Table 8 contains regression results under various model specifications. Column 1 presents
a simple regression of SUE on lagged GEORET , with firm and year-quarter fixed effects.
The estimated coefficient on GEORETt−1 is 0.0019 (t = 2.12). In Columns 2 and 3, we add
the focal firms’ own lagged SUEs as control variables, while Column 3 includes industry and
year-quarter fixed effects. The results show that GEORET continues to positively predict
future SUEs. These results further confirm that the short-window announcement returns
we documented in Section 6.1 are driven by GEORET ’s ability to anticipate the directional
changes in focal firm’s future earnings.
6.2.2 Forecasting short interests
Because returns of geo-peers contain value-relevant information about focal firm, sophisti-
cated investors may exploit such information in their trading decisions. Short sellers appear
to fit the profile of informed traders in the equity market. A large literature shows that short
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sellers’ positions can predict future stock returns and short sellers are particularly skilled at
analyzing public information (see, among others, Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) and
Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012)). If short sellers exploit information contained in
GEORET , they should trade in the direction indicated by GEORET .
To examine whether GEORET predict short sellers’ trades, we run Fama–MacBeth
regressions of change in short interest ratio on lagged GEORET . Specifically, the dependent
variable is the change in short interest ratio from the previous month, where short interest
ratio is defined as number of shares shorted over total number of shares outstanding.16 The
main explanatory variable of interest is lagged GEORET . Controls include firm size, book-
to-market ratio, gross profitability, asset growth, the stock’s own lagged monthly return.
If short sellers make use of information contained in stock performance of geo-peers, the
coefficient on GEORETt−1 should be negative.
Table 9 reports the time series averages of the cross-sectional regression coefficients.
Column 1 shows the coefficient on GEORETt−1 is -0.19 (t=-3.0). In column 2, we add the
lagged industry return (INDRETt−1) and lagged return of a portfolio of firms headquartered
in the same state as the focal firm (HQRETt−1) in regression. Compared to Column 1, the
coefficient on GEORET barely changes and remains highly significant with a t-statistics of
-2.84. These results suggest that short sellers increase their short positions on focal firm
when the recent stock performance of its geography-linked peers are poor. To sum up, the
tests based on earnings surprises and short interests (both are non-return-based metrics)
lend further support to the mispricing explanation.
6.3 Evidence from analyst information updating
In this section, we examine analyst forecasting behavior to provide direct evidence on the
limited attention channel. This setting is particularly useful because analyst earnings forecast
16We get the month-end short interests data from Compustat.
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revisions directly measure investors’ belief updating process. If analysts are slow to carry
information across geography-linked firms due to limited processing capacity, we should
observe past forecast revisions of geographic peers predict future forecast revisions of focal
firms. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a test similar to the return predictability test
except that we use analyst forecast revisions of annual EPS instead of stock returns.
Table 10 presents the results. All of the regressions include lagged forecast revision,
past 1-month and past 12-month (skipping the most recent month) return, log of market
capitalization, and log of book-to-market ratio as control variables. The dependent variables,
FRP and FRB, are the one-month-ahead revision in consensus annual EPS forecast of the
focal firm scaled by lagged stock price (Columns 1 and 2) and book value of equity per share
(Columns 3 and 4), respectively. Our variable of interest is GEOFRPt−1 (GEOFRBt−1),
defined as the average forecast revisions of the focal firm’s geo-peers in the previous month,
using the geographic linkage measure (GEO) constructed in Section 3 as weights. Consistent
with our hypothesis, column 1 shows that the coefficient on GEOFRPt−1 is 0.0528 (t=4.20),
suggesting that the average forecast revision of geography-linked firms is a strong predictor
of future revisions of focal firm.
In column 2, we add average forecast revisions of other economically related firms.
Specifically, INDFRPt−1 is the market capitalization-weighted average forecast revisions
of all other firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry as the focal firm. STATEFRPt−1
is the average forecast revisions of all other firms headquartered in the same state as the
focal firm. ANALY STFRPt−1 is calculated as the weighted average forecast revisions of
shared analyst-linked peers, using the weights defined in Ali and Hirshleifer (2020). The
coefficient on GEOFRPt−1 decreases to 0.0313 but remains highly significant (t=2.73). The
coefficients on INDFRPt−1, STATEFRPt−1 and ANALY STFRPt−1 are also significantly
positive, consistent with the results in Ali and Hirshleifer (2020). In columns 3 and 4, we
show the same pattern holds using GEOFRBt−1 (forecast revision scaled by book value of
equity per share) as the measure. These results suggest that the return lead-lag effects that
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we show may at least partially be driven by analyst sluggish information updating. This
is consistent with studies documenting inefficient forecast behaviors by analysts (Bouchaud,
Krueger, Landier, and Thesmar (2019)). In addition, we find that the coefficients on lagged
forecast revisions (FRPt−1 and FRBt−1) are highly significant, consistent with prior studies
that past forecast revisions of a stock are strong predictors of subsequent forecast revisions
of the same stock. Given that analysts underreact to news about the same firm, it is very
plausible that they might also underreact to information from other firms that are merely
geographically linked to the focal firm.
7 Conclusion
Using detailed information of establishments owned by U.S. public firms from 1990 to 2012,
we construct a novel measure of geographic linkage between firms that are from different
industries and headquartered in different regions. We show that the returns of geography-
linked firms have strong predictive power for focal firm returns and fundamentals. A long-
short strategy based on this effect yields annual value-weighted alpha of approximately 6.5%.
This effect is distinct from other cross-firm return predictability and is not easily attributable
to risk-based explanations. It is more pronounced for focal firms that receive lower investor
attention and are more costly to arbitrage. In addition, we find sell-side analysts similarly
underreact, as their forecast revisions of geography-linked firms predict their future revisions
of focal firms. Our results are broadly consistent with sluggish price adjustment to more
nuanced geographic information.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the key variables used in the cross-sectional regressions. The sample includes all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq-listed securities 
with share codes 10 or 11 that are contained in the CRSP/Compustat merged data file. Financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47) and 
stocks with prices less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. All variables except for future stock returns are winsorized within each cross-section at 1% 
and 99% levels. All statistics is computed cross-sectionally (for each calendar month) and then averaged across all months. % Value of CRSP is the total market 
capitalization of our sample firms as a percentage of the total market capitalization of the CRSP universe, computed each month and averaged across all months. 
Panel A reports the sample coverage statistics and descriptive statistics for the key variables. Panel B reports pairwise correlations, with 5% statistical 
significance indicated in bold. All variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1. The sample consists of 668,117 firm-month observations spanning 1990 to 
2013. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics                 
  Mean Std Min 25PC Median 75PC Max 
# of Firms  2320 347 1618 2082 2355 2556 2977 
% Value of CRSP  0.57 0.07 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.63 0.70 
Average # of geo-peers per focal firm  795 651 1.70 307 594 1098 3022 
GEO  0.09 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 1.00 
GEORET  0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 
RET  0.01 0.15 -0.67 -0.07 0.00 0.08 1.72 
INDRET  0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.08 
HQRET  0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 
RET(t-1)  0.01 0.14 -0.33 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.54 
SIZE  12.40 1.96 8.43 10.98 12.30 13.68 17.44 
BM  0.68 0.59 0.04 0.29 0.52 0.87 3.36 
GP  0.39 0.29 -0.55 0.22 0.36 0.53 1.32 
AG  0.25 0.73 -0.46 -0.02 0.08 0.24 6.08 
MOM   0.16 0.58 -0.71 -0.19 0.05 0.36 2.78 
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Panel B: Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal 
 
 
                
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
GEORET(t-1) 1  0.014 0.078 0.324 0.058 0.006 0.005 0.006 -0.005 0.016 
RET 2 0.014  0.018 0.012 -0.023 0.040 0.011 0.024 -0.005 0.045 
INDRET(t-1) 3 0.095 0.021  0.079 0.115 -0.011 0.000 0.020 -0.002 0.003 
HQRET(t-1) 4 0.316 0.012 0.104  0.158 -0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.010 0.015 
RET(t-1) 5 0.062 -0.018 0.118 0.174  0.017 0.020 0.022 -0.016 0.016 
SIZE 6 -0.003 -0.009 -0.012 -0.004 -0.030  -0.370 -0.026 0.204 0.109 
BM 7 0.005 0.020 0.003 0.009 0.035 -0.387  -0.173 -0.269 -0.142 
GP 8 0.001 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.014 -0.016 -0.105  0.015 0.069 
AG 9 -0.004 -0.022 -0.004 -0.008 -0.027 0.074 -0.159 -0.096  0.021 
MOM 10 0.014 0.024 0.006 0.013 0.003 0.030 -0.115 0.058 0.008   
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Table 2 Fundamental Linkages 
This table reports the panel regression results of fundamental linkages between focal firm and its geography-linked peers. Sales growth(t) is calculated as Sales 
per share(t) /Sales per share(t-1) −1. Profit growth is calculated as (Profit(t) – Profit(t-1))/average (Assets(t), Assets(t-1)), where Profit is measured as operating 
income before depreciation (Compustat data item OIBDP). Geo sales growth is the weighted average sales growth of focal firm’s geography-linked peers, using 
the geographic linkage measure defined in section 3. Industry sales growth is measured as the market capitalization-weighted average sales growth of all other 
firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry as the focal firm. Same-state sales growth is measured as the equal-weighted average sales growth of all other firms 
headquartered in the same state as the focal firm. Analyst sales growth is calculated the weighted average sales growth of analyst-linked peers, using the weights 
defined in Ali and Hirshleifer (2019). The profit growth of peer firms is defined similarly. The sample is limited to firms with December fiscal year ends. All 
variables are measured at the end of each calendar year and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include year fixed effect and size and 
book-to-market ratio as control variables. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by year are shown below coefficient estimates. The sample period is 
from 1990 to 2013.  
  sales_growth(t) sales_growth(t)   profit_growth(t) profit_growth(t) 
Geo sales growth(t) 0.311*** 0.199*    
 (3.25) (1.90)    
Same-state sales growth(t)  0.112***    
  (3.00)    
Industry sales growth(t)  0.186***    
  (4.23)    
Analyst sales growth(t)  0.802***    
  (6.50)    
Geo profit growth(t)    0.526*** 0.124** 
    (6.26) (2.26) 
Same-state profit growth(t)     0.0550*** 
     (2.83) 
Industry profit growth(t)     0.308*** 
     (8.28) 
Analyst profit growth(t)     0.887*** 
     (7.95) 
Size(t) -0.0292*** -0.0156***  0.00371** 0.00208 
 (-7.37) (-6.05)  (2.72) (1.62) 
BM(t) -0.0351*** -0.0186*  -0.00625*** -0.00839*** 
 (-3.91) (-2.06)  (-3.54) (-4.21) 
Constant 0.528*** 0.253***  -0.0353* -0.0207 
 (9.76) (6.78)  (-1.98) (-1.21) 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
adj. R-sq 0.015 0.038  0.020 0.061 
N 36553 30070   40185 30277 
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Table 3 Geographic momentum strategy, abnormal returns 1990–2013.  
This table reports abnormal returns and factor loadings for a geographic momentum strategy. Firms are ranked and assigned into decile portfolios at the 
beginning of every calendar month, based on the prior-month return to a portfolio of their geography-linked peer firms (GEORET). We exclude geographic 
peers from the same industry (based on Fama-French 48 industry groups) and headquartered in the same state as the focal firm when constructing GEORET. 
All stocks are equal- (value-) weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain equal- (value-) weights. All 
non-financial stocks with stock price greater than $1 at portfolio formation are included. Excess return is the raw return of the portfolio over the risk-free rate. 
Alpha is the intercept from a regression of monthly excess return on factor returns. Factor returns are from the Kenneth French Data Library, and factor models 
include: CAPM model; the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model; a four-factor model including Fama-French three-factor and Carhart’s (1997) momentum 
factor, Fama-French (2015) five-factor model, seven-factor model (Fama-French five-factor plus the momentum and short-term reversal factor) and Q-factors 
model of Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015). L/S is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that holds the top 10% stocks ranked by GEORET and sells short the bottom 
10%. Panel B reports the alpha and the risk factor loadings, where the benchmark is a five-factor model (Fama-French three-factor plus the momentum and 
short-term reversal factor). Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, with 5% statistical significance 
indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio returns             
Decile Excess returns (%) CAPM alpha (%) 3-Factor alpha (%) 4-Factor alpha (%) 5-Factor alpha (%) 7-Factor alpha (%) Q-Factor alpha (%) 
1 0.40 -0.28 -0.21 -0.28 -0.17 -0.24 -0.15 
(low) (1.24) (-1.77) (-1.45) (-1.92) (-1.07) (-1.50) (-0.86) 
10 0.94 0.25 0.32 0.26 0.40 0.36 0.47 
(high) (2.79) (1.35) (1.81) (1.41) (2.14) (2.07) (2.26) 
L/S 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.38 
(Equal-weights) (2.97) (3.19) (3.24) (3.08) (2.73) (3.09) (2.59) 
L/S 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.62 
(value-weights) (2.62) (2.50) (2.45) (2.40) (2.37) (2.65) (2.64) 
Panel B: Risk factor loadings           
  Alpha (%) MKT SMB HML MOM ST_Rev 
1 -0.30 1.03 0.01 -0.21 0.09 0.002 
(low) (-2.04) (24.52) (0.20) (-3.18) (2.28) (2.40) 
10 0.27 1.08 0.22 -0.25 0.06 -0.001 
(high) (1.55) (18.19) (2.74) (-2.64) (1.27) (-0.94) 
L/S 0.44 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.003 
(Equal-weights) (3.46) (0.64) (1.13) (0.14) (0.22) (-5.14) 
L/S 0.57 -0.04 0.21 -0.04 -0.03 -0.003 
(value-weights) (2.72) (0.79) (2.00) (-0.44) (-0.60) (-2.99) 
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Table 4 Fama-MacBeth regressions, 1990-2013 
This table reports the result for Fama-MacBeth return forecasting regressions. The sample period is 
from 1990 to 2013. The dependent variable is the focal firm’s monthly return (in percentage) RET and 
the key explanatory variable of interest is lagged geography-linked firms’ return (GEORET). In Column 
2, we add focal firm’s lagged value-weighted industry return (INDRET) and the lagged value-weighted 
return of a portfolio of firms headquartered in the same state as the focal firm (HQRET). In Column 3, 
we add the focal firm’s lagged tech-peer return (TECHRET) constructed following Lee et al. (2019). In 
Column 4, a portfolio of focal firm’s pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRET) is added based on 
Compustat Segment data following Cohen and Lou (2012). In Column 5, we add the lagged returns 
from a portfolio of the focal firm’s supplier (SUPPRET) and customer (CUSTRET) industries. These 
portfolios are constructed using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Input-Output data (at the 
summary industry level) following Menzly and Ozbas (2010). In Column 6, we add the lagged returns 
of focal firms’ product market peers (TNICRET) following Hoberg and Phillips (2018).  In Column 7, 
we add the lagged returns of stocks are connected through shared analyst coverage (CFRET) following 
Ali and Hirshleifer (2019). We also control for firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), gross 
profitability (GP), asset growth (AG), the firm’s own lagged monthly return (RET(t-1)), and medium-
term price momentum (MOM). Other variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. The sample excludes 
financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47) and stocks with a price less than $1 
at portfolio formation. Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar month, and the standard errors 
are Newey-West adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics 
are reported below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) 
GEORET 8.317*** 5.957*** 5.489*** 4.198** 9.463** 6.281*** 3.086** 
 (4.81) (4.01) (2.60) (2.26) (2.58) (4.09) (2.35) 
INDRET  12.08*** 5.818*** 7.569*** -2.130 8.432*** 5.140*** 
  (5.48) (2.67) (4.37) (-0.25) (3.45) (2.78) 
HQRET  5.849*** 4.755*** 6.381*** 6.273** 4.635*** 3.050*** 
  (5.64) (3.11) (4.19) (2.05) (3.64) (2.80) 
TECHRET   8.583***     
   (3.95)     
PCRET    5.800***    
    (3.61)    
SUPPRET     3.442   
     (0.42)   
CUSTRET     4.725   
     (0.54)   
TNICRET      0.891**  
      (2.10)  
CFRET       14.30*** 
       (7.13) 
RET(t-1) -2.760*** -3.173*** -4.485*** -4.704*** -4.451*** -2.630*** -4.007*** 
 (-5.50) (-6.16) (-7.23) (-7.96) (-3.84) (-3.96) (-7.33) 
SIZE -0.0425 -0.0392 -0.0687 0.000813 -0.0485 -0.0735 -0.0560 
 (-0.81) (-0.75) (-1.01) (0.02) (-0.53) (-1.07) (-1.10) 
BM 0.421** 0.444*** 0.438* 0.622*** 0.779*** 0.317 0.367** 
 (2.50) (2.74) (1.90) (3.71) (2.98) (1.54) (2.53) 
GP 0.681*** 0.649*** 0.771** 0.833*** 1.287** 0.578* 0.611*** 
 (2.89) (2.85) (2.38) (3.47) (2.53) (1.78) (2.73) 
AG -0.429*** -0.420*** -0.430*** -0.383** -0.482 -0.544*** -0.422*** 
 (-6.23) (-6.00) (-4.39) (-2.45) (-0.88) (-5.39) (-6.00) 
MOM 0.465 0.460 0.274 0.262 -0.108 -0.0546 0.472 
 (1.43) (1.38) (0.87) (0.63) (-0.24) (-0.13) (1.36) 
Constant 0.951 0.711 1.070 -0.189 0.705 0.936 1.000 
 (0.99) (0.75) (0.87) (-0.21) (0.46) (0.73) (1.02) 
Average R-sq 0.0357 0.039 0.0536 0.0493 0.0894 0.0489 0.0518 
N 723764 668117 257213 147494 171365 399911 532062 
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Table 5 Arbitrage costs and limited attention 
This table reports the results of a set of cross-sectional (time-series) analyses to evaluate the sensitivity 
of geographic momentum to proxies for limited attention, arbitrage costs and investor sentiment. The 
tests are Fama-MacBeth return forecasting regressions where the dependent variable RET is the monthly 
focal firm stock return (in percentage). The explanatory variables are the lagged geography-linked firms’ 
return (GEORET), lagged industry return (INDRET), lagged value-weighted return of a portfolio of 
firms headquartered in the same state as the focal firm (HQRET), plus a number of interaction terms. 
SIZE is the natural log of market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year. IO is the percentage 
of institutional ownership at the end of the previous fiscal-year end. CANALYST is the average number 
of analysts covering the focal firm and geography-linked firms at the previous year end following Ali 
and Hirshleifer (2019). IDVOL is the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of daily stock 
excess returns in the pre-30 days on the Fama and French (1993) factors (at least ten daily returns 
required). ILLIQUIDITY and SPREAD are the Amihud illiquidity and bid-ask spread of the firm at the end 
of the previous month, respectively. SENTIMENT is the Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment index 
based on first principal component of five sentiment proxies. All variables are defined in Appendix 
Table A1. All the interaction terms except for the SENTIMENT are based on indicator variables that 
take the value of one if the underlying variable is above the cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. 
For investor sentiment, we create a dummy variable equals one if SENTIMENT is above sample media, 
and zero otherwise. The usual firm-level controls are also included. The sample excludes financial firms 
(Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47) and stocks with a price less than $1 at portfolio 
formation. Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar month, and the standard errors are Newey-
West adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are reported 
below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. The sample period is from 1990 to 2013.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) RET (%) 
GEORET 8.319*** 7.879*** 5.882*** 2.621** 3.044** 3.339* 4.838*** 
 (4.36) (4.40) (3.62) (1.98) (2.11) (1.71) (4.00) 
INDRET 12.18*** 11.80*** 11.15*** 12.11*** 12.04*** 11.94*** 12.080*** 
 (5.51) (5.50) (5.09) (5.55) (5.51) (5.33) (5.48) 
HQRET 5.991*** 5.894*** 4.983*** 5.498*** 5.480*** 5.468*** 5.849*** 
 (5.76) (5.72) (4.28) (5.50) (5.42) (5.01) (5.64) 
GEORET*SIZE>Median -5.463**       
 (-2.48)       
GEORET*IO>Median 
 -4.146**      
  (-2.02)      
GEORET*CANALYST>Median 
  -1.316     
   (-0.70)     
GEORET*IDVOL>Median 
   5.318***    
    (2.61)    
GEORET*ILLIQUIDITY>Median 
    4.595**   
     (2.54)   
GEORET*SPREAD>Median 
     5.753**  
      (2.41)  
GEORET*SENTIMENT>Median      
 
1.119* 
      
 
(1.87) 
RET(t-1) -3.172*** -3.220*** -3.368*** -3.278*** -3.242*** -3.172*** -3.173*** 
 (-6.15) (-6.24) (-6.18) (-6.43) (-6.34) (-6.15) (-6.16) 
SIZE -0.0556 -0.0516 -0.0980 -0.0660 -0.0393 -0.0556 -0.039 
 (-1.14) (-1.02) (-1.51) (-1.58) (-0.88) (-1.14) (-0.75) 
BM 0.446*** 0.410*** 0.302* 0.413*** 0.437*** 0.446*** 0.444*** 
 (2.76) (2.64) (1.83) (2.70) (2.84) (2.76) (2.74) 
GP 0.653*** 0.638*** 0.631*** 0.635*** 0.648*** 0.653*** 0.649*** 
 (2.89) (2.83) (2.62) (2.90) (2.98) (2.89) (2.85) 
AG -0.419*** -0.419*** -0.429*** -0.408*** -0.411*** -0.419*** -0.420*** 
 (-6.07) (-6.14) (-6.10) (-5.79) (-6.03) (-6.07) (-6.00) 
MOM 0.463 0.464 0.549 0.500 0.483 0.463 0.460 
 (1.39) (1.41) (1.58) (1.56) (1.47) (1.39) (1.38) 
CONSTANT 0.768 0.867 1.477 1.176 0.782 0.768 0.879 
 (0.84) (0.92) (1.32) (1.53) (0.95) (0.84) (1.21) 
Average R-sq 0.04 0.041 0.047 0.043 0.043 0.04 0.0424 
N 668117 661189 546712 668116 667847 668117 668117 
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Table 6 Testing the Common Exposure Channel and the Spillover Channel 
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on GEORET, predicted regional economic activity 
(PREA
⊥
) and natural hazards experienced by focal firm’s geographic peers (GEO_HAZARD). The sample period 
is from 1990 to 2013. The dependent variable is the focal firm’s monthly return (in percentage) RET. Following 
Smajlbegovic (2019), the predicted regional economic activity proxy, PREA, is constructed from a linear 
combination of predicted state economic activity growth rates weighted by firm’s fraction of sales in all states it 
operates. The orthogonalized proxy PREA
⊥
 is the sum of a constant and the residuals of cross-sectional regressions 
of PREA on return sensitivities to national economic activity and the Fama and French (1993) risk factors. 
GEO_HAZARD is the weighted average of dummies indicating geo-peers that are headquartered in states affected 
by any natural disaster at month t-1. In column (2), we restrict the sample to firms that do not have establishments 
in the areas affected by natural disasters at month t and month t-1. The natural disaster data is from  SHELDUS 
(Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States). We also include focal firm’s lagged value-
weighted industry return (INDRET) and the lagged value-weighted return of a portfolio of firms headquartered in 
the same state as the focal firm (HQRET), focal firm’s firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), gross 
profitability (GP), asset growth (AG), the firm’s own lagged monthly return (RET(t-1)), and medium-term price 
momentum (MOM). All variables are described in Appendix Table A1. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99% in the cross-section. The sample excludes financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47) 
and stocks with a price less than $1 at portfolio formation. Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar 
month, and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) 
  RET(%) RET(%) 
GEORET 5.828***  
 (3.97)  
GEO_HAZARD  -1.227*** 
  (-2.71) 
INDRET 11.900*** 17.490*** 
 (5.31) (5.63) 
HQRET 5.659*** 5.427* 
 (5.94) (1.82) 
PREA
⊥ 
0.153***  
 (2.77)  
RET(t-1) -3.290*** -3.764*** 
 (-6.82) (-6.16) 
SIZE -0.040 -0.068 
 (-0.76) (-0.91) 
BM 0.476*** 0.606*** 
 (2.98) (2.80) 
GP 0.669*** 0.069 
 (2.95) (0.17) 
AG -0.426*** -0.382*** 
 (-6.15) (-4.14) 
MOM 0.452 0.476 
 (1.34) (1.57) 
Constant 0.537 1.758 
 (0.58) (1.38) 
Average R-sq 0.039 0.044 
N 662,877 107,111 
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Table 7 Returns on Earnings Announcement Days 
This table reports regressions of announcement window daily returns DRET (in percentage) on the 
geography-linked firms’ return (GEORET), earnings announcement date dummy variable (EDAY), and 
the interaction term between earnings announcement date dummy and GEORET. Geography-linked 
firms’ return (GEORET) of a focal firm is calculated as the average monthly return of geographic peers 
weighted by pairwise geographic linkage measure defined in section 3. EDAY is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the daily observation is during an earnings announcement window, and zero 
otherwise. An earnings announcement window is defined as the one-day (Column 1 and 2) or three-day 
window (Column 3 and 4) centered on an earnings announcement date. Following Engelberg et al. 
(2018), we obtain earnings announcement dates from the Compustat quarterly database, examine the 
firm’s trading volume scaled by market trading volume for the day before, the day of, and the day after 
the reported earnings announcement date, and define the day with the highest volume as the earnings 
announcement day. We control for day-fixed effect and other lagged control variables including lagged 
values for each of the past ten days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume.  Key 
variables are described in Appendix Table A1. Standard errors are clustered on time. T-statistics are in parentheses, 
coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 
from 1990 to 2013. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 One-day window Three-day window 
  DRET (%) DRET (%) DRET (%) DRET (%) 
GEORET 0.347*** 0.443*** 0.339*** 0.434*** 
 (2.82) (3.44) (2.76) (3.38) 
GEORET * EDAY 0.578** 0.623** 0.423** 0.458** 
 (2.04) (2.23) (2.09) (2.26) 
EDAY 0.227*** 0.264*** 0.0823*** 0.119*** 
 (13.50) (15.66) (7.37) (10.55) 
Lagged controls No Yes No Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R-sq 0.048 0.069 0.048 0.069 
N 17953058 17875817 17953058 17875817 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617417
  
 
Table 8 Future Earnings Surprise 
This table reports forecasting regressions of next-quarter’s standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) on 
GEORET. SUE is defined as the difference between the actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) and 
analyst consensus forecast of quarterly EPS scaled by stock prices in the month before quarterly 
earnings announcement. GEORET is calculated based on past three-month returns of geography-linked 
peers of the focal firm. We include firm fixed effect, year-quarter fixed effect in columns 1 and 2. In 
column 3, we include industry fixed effect and year-quarter fixed effect. We add one-quarter to four-
quarter lags of the firm’s own SUEs as control variables. Key variables are described in Appendix Table 
A1. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% in the cross-section. In parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates, t-statistics are reported using standard errors clustered in firm and time dimensions. Coefficients 
marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from 1990 to 
2013.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  SUE(t) SUE(t) SUE(t) 
GEORET(t-1) 0.00191** 0.00239* 0.00257* 
 (2.12) (2.02) (1.98) 
SUE(t-1)  0.0667* 0.134*** 
  (1.97) (3.25) 
SUE(t-2)  0.0306 0.0812*** 
  (1.45) (3.44) 
SUE(t-3)  -0.00743 0.0362** 
  (-0.54) (2.73) 
SUE(t-4)  0.0129 0.0543 
  (0.45) (1.51) 
Constant -0.000798*** -0.000386*** -0.000394*** 
 (-28.04) (-8.90) (-5.85) 
Firm FE YES YES NO 
Industry FE NO NO YES 
Year-quarter FE YES YES YES 
adj. R-sq 0.065 0.069 0.043 
N 163169 90493 90000 
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Table 9 Change in Short Interest Ratios 
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth regressions of change in short interest ratios (SR_change) on 
GEORET. The dependent variable is the focal firm’s monthly change in short interest ratios (SR_change) 
and the key explanatory variable of interest is one-month lagged geography-linked firms’ return 
(GEORET). We also include focal firm’s firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), gross 
profitability (GP), asset growth (AG), the firm’s own lagged monthly return (RET(t-1)), and medium-
term price momentum (MOM). Key variables are described in Appendix Table A1. All variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% in the cross-section. The sample excludes financial firms (Fama-French 48 
industry code between 44 and 47) and stocks with a price less than $1 at portfolio formation. Cross-
sectional regressions are run every calendar month, and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted 
(up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. T-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with 
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from 1990 to 2013. 
 
  (1) (2) 
  SR_change (%) (t) SR_change (%) (t) 
GEORET(t-1) -0.190*** -0.196*** 
 (-3.00) (-2.84) 
INDRET(t-1)  0.010 
  (0.20) 
HQRET(t-1)  0.142*** 
  (3.14) 
RET(t-1) 0.176*** 0.174*** 
 (3.89) (3.70) 
SIZE 0.002 0.002 
 (1.31) (1.24) 
BM -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-3.89) (-4.43) 
GP -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (-3.12) (-3.23) 
AG 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (3.66) (3.66) 
MOM 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (5.35) (5.43) 
Constant -0.010 -0.009 
 (-0.44) (-0.37) 
Average R-sq 0.013 0.014 
N 630,026 581,907 
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Table 10 Lead-lag Effects in Analyst Forecast Revisions 
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
analyst forecast revision. FRP and FRB are the monthly change in analyst consensus forecast of annual 
EPS scaled by lagged stock price and book value of equity per share, respectively. GEOFRP(t-1) is the 
weighted average analyst forecast revisions of a focal firm’s geography-linked peers in the previous 
month, using the geographic linkage measure defined in section 3 as weights. INDFRP(t-1) is measured 
as the market capitalization-weighted average forecast revisions of all other firms in the same Fama-
French 48 industry as the focal firm. STATEFRP(t-1) is measured as the equal-weighted average forecast 
revisions of all other firms headquartered in the same state as the focal firm. ANALYSTFRP(t-1) is 
calculated as the weighted average forecast revisions of analyst-linked peers, using the weights defined 
in Ali and Hirshleifer (2019).  GEOFRB, STATEFRB, INDFRB, and ANALYSTFRB are constructed in 
a similar way based on FRB. Control variables include the 1-month lagged forecast revisions, past 1-
month return, past 12-month return (excluding the most recent month), log of market capitalization, and 
log of book-to-market ratio. Key variables are described in Appendix Table A1. The sample excludes 
financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry group between 44 and 47) and stocks with a price less than 
$1 at portfolio formation. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients 
marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from 1990 to 
2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FRP(t) FRP(t) FRB(t) FRB(t) 
GEOFRP(t-1) 0.0528*** 0.0313***   
 (4.20) (2.73)   
STATEFRP(t-1)  0.0155**   
  (2.18)   
INDFRP(t-1)  0.134***   
  (7.31)   
ANALYSTFRP(t-1)  0.0920***   
  (8.84)   
GEOFRB(t-1)   0.0370*** 0.0248* 
   (2.83) (1.94) 
STATEFRB(t-1)    0.00777 
    (1.39) 
INDFRB(t-1)    0.0448*** 
    (5.10) 
ANALYSTFRB(t-1)    0.0231*** 
    (4.38) 
FRP(t-1) 0.0472*** 0.0407***   
 (9.36) (8.50)   
FRB(t-1)   0.0503*** 0.0484*** 
   (7.59) (7.40) 
RET(t-1) 0.00905*** 0.00905*** 0.0204*** 0.0204*** 
 (14.49) (14.51) (19.60) (19.65) 
RET(t-13, t-2) 0.00113*** 0.00110*** 0.00264*** 0.00261*** 
 (8.52) (8.51) (9.34) (9.35) 
SIZE 0.000273*** 0.000271*** 0.000662*** 0.000668*** 
 (15.24) (15.22) (14.73) (15.51) 
BM -0.000488*** -0.000475*** 0.00200*** 0.00201*** 
 (-5.59) (-5.98) (6.87) (6.95) 
Constant -0.00573*** -0.00551*** -0.0156*** -0.0154*** 
 (-16.21) (-15.72) (-17.10) (-17.33) 
Average R-sq 0.0383 0.0428 0.0341 0.0363 
N 456785 454719 443155 441177 
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Figure 1. Cumulative performance of the trading strategy.  
This graph shows the time series evolution of a $1 investment in each of three portfolios. The red line 
is a market (S&P500) portfolio, where dividends are reinvested in the market. The blue (green) line 
represents a long-only strategy that value-weights the top (bottom) 10% of firms ranked by the return 
of its geography-linked peers (GEORET) at the end of the previous month. The portfolios are monthly 
rebalanced and sample period is from 1990 to 2013.  
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Figure 2. Long-Short Portfolio Performance Persistence 
This figure plots the cumulative returns of the long-short portfolio in the six months after portfolio 
formation. At the beginning of every calendar month, all firms are ranked in ascending order on the 
basis of the return of a portfolio of its geography-linked peers (GEORET) at the end of the previous 
month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of ten decile portfolios. All stocks are value- (equal-) 
weighted within each portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain 
value- (equal-) weights. The long-short portfolio is a zero-cost portfolio that buys the top decile and 
sells short the bottom decile. The graph depicts the cumulative returns to both an equal-weighted 
(dashed line) and a value-weighted (dotted line) long-short portfolio. The sample excludes financial 
firms and stocks with a price of less than $1 at portfolio formation. The sample period is from 1990 to 
2013.  
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Appendix Table A1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition   
GEO Geographic linkage measure 𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 is defined the uncentered correlation of the 
distribution of establishment sales between two firms i and j across all counties in 
US. Establishment-level sales data is from NETS publicly listed database.  
GEORET Geography-linked return is defined as the weighted average return of a focal firm’s 
geography-linked firms, using the geographic linkage GEO as weights.  
RET Stock monthly raw return adjusted for delisting bias following Shumway (1997).  
INDRET Industry return, defined as value-weighted average return of Fama-French 48 
industries.  
HQRET Value-weighted return of a portfolio of firms headquartered in the same state as the 
focal firm.  
SIZE The natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. 
BM Book-to-market ratio is the most recent fiscal year-end report of book value divided 
by the market capitalization at the end of calendar year t-1. Book value equals the 
value of common stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax 
credits, and minus the book value of preferred stock. 
GP Gross profitability is defined as sales revenue minus cost of goods sold scaled by 
assets, following Novy-Marx (2013). 
AG Asset growth is defined as year-over-year growth rate of total asset, following 
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008).  
MOM Medium-term price momentum variable, defined as focal firm’s stock return for 
the last 12 months excluding the most recent month. 
RET (-1) Lagged monthly raw return, or short-term return reversal variable, defined as focal 
firm’s stock return in month t-1. 
SUE Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is defined as the difference between the 
actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) and analyst consensus forecast of 
quarterly EPS scaled by stock prices in the month 
before quarterly earnings announcement.  
FRP (FRB) 
 
IO  
 
CANALYST 
 
SPREAD 
 
ILLIQUIDITY 
 
IDVOL 
One-month-ahead revision in consensus annual EPS forecast on the focal firm 
scaled by lagged stock price (book value of equity per share).  
The percentage of institutional ownership at the end of the previous fiscal-year end.  
Average number of analysts covering the focal firm and geography-linked peers at 
the previous year-end.  
Bid-ask spread is calculated based on daily high and low prices following Corwin 
and Schultz (2012).  
Following Amihud (2002), Illiquidity is defined as the average daily ratio of 
absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume within a  month. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
regression of daily excess stock returns on Fama and French (1993) three factors 
within a month (at least ten daily returns required) following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, 
and Zhang (2006).  
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Appendix Table A2 Long-horizon lags 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth return forecasting regressions. The sample period is from 1990 to 
2013. The dependent variable is the focal firm’s monthly return (in percentage) RET. The key 
explanatory variables of interest are lagged geography-linked firms’ return over past 6 months in 
column 1 (GEORET (t-6, t-1)), over past 12 months in column 2 (GEORET(t-12, t-1)), and over past 
24 months in column 3 (GEORET(t-24,t-1)). Other variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. The 
sample excludes financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47) and stocks with a 
price less than $1 at portfolio formation. Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar month, and 
the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Fama-
MacBeth t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GEORET (t-6, t-1) 1.678**     
 (2.25)   
GEORET (t-12, t-1)  0.918**  
  (2.40)  
GEORET (t-24, t-1)   0.381 
   (1.28) 
INDRET 12.02*** 11.48*** 10.73*** 
 (5.43) (5.33) (5.02) 
HQRET 6.249*** 6.114*** 5.901*** 
 (5.17) (5.33) (4.94) 
RET(t-1) -3.213*** -3.200*** -3.313*** 
 (-6.20) (-6.10) (-6.19) 
SIZE -0.0446 -0.0593 -0.0556 
 (-0.83) (-1.09) (-1.01) 
BM 0.469*** 0.461*** 0.430** 
 (2.86) (2.77) (2.49) 
GP 0.616*** 0.606*** 0.532** 
 (2.70) (2.61) (2.18) 
AG -0.435*** -0.431*** -0.558*** 
 (-6.20) (-5.90) (-6.30) 
MOM 0.412 0.365 0.266 
 (1.23) (1.07) (0.78) 
CONSTANT 0.727 0.945 1.001 
 (0.79) (0.99) (0.98) 
Average R-sq 0.0398 0.0397 0.0399 
N 658799 647766 588004 
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Appendix Table A3 Robustness Tests. 
This table reports various robustness tests for Fama-MacBeth return forecasting regressions. The sample period is from 1990 to 2013. The dependent variable 
is the focal firm’s monthly return (in percentage) RET and the key explanatory variable of interest is lagged geography-linked firms’ return (GEORET). In 
Column 1 and 2, we exclude stocks with price less than $5 or market capitalization below the 10th NYSE percentile, respectively. In column 3, we restrict our 
sample to focal firms with establishments in at least two counties. Columns 4 and 5 report the results for two subperiods: 1990-2001 and 2002–2013. Columns 
6-8 shows the results by using GEORET constructed using geographic linkage measures lagged by 1, 3 and 5 years, respectively. In column 9, we construct the 
GEORET using the top 50 geo-peers of the focal firm. In Column 10, we construct geographic linkage measure using number of employees at firm 
establishments. Other variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. The sample excludes financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 44 and 47) 
and stocks with a price less than $1 at portfolio formation. Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar month, and the standard errors are Newey-West 
adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and 
∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Stock price 
greater than 
$5  
Mktcap 
above 10th 
NYSE 
percentile 
Establishments 
in >=2 counties 
1990-2001 2002-2013 
GEO lagged 
by 1 year 
GEO lagged 
by 3 year 
GEO lagged 
by 5 years 
Top 50 geo-
peer firms 
Construct GEO 
using employment       
GEORET 3.741*** 4.989*** 6.574*** 6.406*** 5.426*** 5.870*** 4.706*** 4.638*** 2.721*** 6.112*** 
 (2.78) (2.98) (3.85) (2.75) (3.24) (3.91) (3.59) (3.97) (3.86) (4.13) 
INDRET 10.26*** 8.992*** 10.88*** 17.24*** 5.987** 11.79*** 10.67*** 8.789*** 12.26*** 12.21*** 
 (4.95) (4.00) (4.67) (7.05) (2.11) (5.22) (5.26) (3.98) (5.53) (5.52) 
HQRET 4.033*** 3.558*** 5.625*** 6.585*** 4.978*** 6.043*** 5.587*** 5.450*** 6.418*** 5.758*** 
 (3.71) (2.93) (5.19) (4.72) (3.25) (5.88) (4.90) (4.33) (5.54) (5.69) 
RET(t-1) -2.364*** -2.393*** -3.680*** -4.408*** -1.714*** -3.136*** -3.055*** -2.567*** -3.167*** -3.181*** 
 (-4.74) (-4.07) (-6.83) (-6.68) (-2.84) (-6.10) (-5.92) (-4.96) (-6.15) (-6.21) 
SIZE -0.0101 -0.0410 -0.0985** -0.0282 -0.0521 -0.0444 -0.0145 -0.00686 -0.0396 -0.0376 
 (-0.26) (-0.78) (-2.14) (-0.37) (-0.77) (-0.86) (-0.29) (-0.14) (-0.76) (-0.72) 
BM 0.376* 0.502** 0.435*** 0.488** 0.393* 0.457*** 0.476*** 0.368** 0.442*** 0.447*** 
 (1.84) (2.29) (2.81) (2.06) (1.83) (2.82) (2.91) (2.30) (2.72) (2.76) 
GP 0.703*** 0.562** 0.686*** 0.912** 0.337 0.611*** 0.597*** 0.592** 0.647*** 0.639*** 
 (2.87) (2.02) (3.08) (2.45) (1.63) (2.71) (2.69) (2.54) (2.86) (2.81) 
AG -0.272*** -0.324*** -0.450*** -0.370*** -0.480*** -0.392*** -0.373*** -0.386*** -0.422*** -0.424*** 
 (-3.72) (-4.85) (-4.60) (-4.60) (-4.00) (-5.16) (-4.38) (-3.72) (-6.02) (-6.00) 
MOM 0.565* 0.479 0.222 1.175*** -0.385 0.399 0.308 0.255 0.461 0.457 
 (1.76) (1.34) (0.56) (7.04) (-0.64) (1.22) (0.95) (0.80) (1.38) (1.38) 
CONSTANT 0.339 0.870 1.550* 0.274 1.228 0.777 0.335 0.330 0.773 0.702 
 (0.43) (0.87) (1.82) (0.21) (0.86) (0.83) (0.36) (0.35) (0.81) (0.74) 
Average R-
sq 0.0476 0.0591 0.0431 0.0448 0.0322 0.0396 0.0418 0.0422 0.0386 0.039 
N 511251 397499 483354 374609 293508 668997 659754 630981 668117 669820 
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Appendix Table A4 Subsample tests for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms 
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on GEORET for the subsample of manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms. Firms with 2-digit NAICS code in the range of 31-33 are classified as manufacturing 
firms while others are classified as non-manufacturing firms. The sample period is from 1990 to 2013. The 
dependent variable is the focal firm’s monthly return (in percentage) RET. We also include focal firm’s lagged 
value-weighted industry return (INDRET) and the lagged value-weighted return of a portfolio of firms 
headquartered in the same state as the focal firm (HQRET), focal firm’s firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), gross profitability (GP), asset growth (AG), the firm’s own lagged monthly return (RET(t-1)), and medium-
term price momentum (MOM). All variables are described in Appendix Table A1. All variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99% in the cross-section. The sample excludes financial firms (Fama-French 48 industry code between 
44 and 47) and stocks with a price less than $1 at portfolio formation. Cross-sectional regressions are run every 
calendar month, and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted (up to 12 lags) for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. T-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  Manufacturing Non-manufacturing 
 RET (%) RET (%) 
GEORET 5.385** 6.254*** 
 (2.57) (3.78) 
INDRET 9.546*** 15.48*** 
 (3.99) (4.97) 
HQRET 4.881*** 5.853*** 
 (3.33) (5.04) 
RET(t-1) -3.993*** -2.465*** 
 (-7.15) (-4.42) 
SIZE -0.0228 -0.0455 
 (-0.41) (-0.85) 
BM 0.625*** 0.315** 
 (3.21) (2.20) 
GP 0.588* 0.750*** 
 (1.78) (3.16) 
AG -0.427*** -0.390*** 
 (-4.93) (-4.29) 
MOM 0.368 0.538 
 (1.10) (1.56) 
CONSTANT 0.657 0.626 
 (0.65) (0.65) 
Average R-sq 0.0444 0.0438 
N 346086 322031 
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